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THE USE OF ECtHR CASE LAW BY THE CJEU AFTER LISBON: THE VIEW OF 
THE LUXEMBOURG INSIDERS  
 
 
A shortened version of this Working Paper will appear in the Maastricht Journal of European 
and Comparative Law 2015(4)1 
 
Abstract: This article examines how and why the CJEU examines and cites the case law of 
the ECtHR after the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2009. The 
CJEU’s practice will be sketched on the basis of 20 interviews with judges, référendaires and 
Advocates General at the CJEU. It will be shown that the CJEU has examined and cited the 
Strasbourg case law less frequently and extensively. Several reasons will be given for this, 
primarily on the basis of the observations of the interviewees as to their readiness to cite the 
Strasbourg case-law. This includes an awareness that both courts are different as well as 
strategic reasons related to the wish to develop an autonomous interpretation of the Charter. 
These two considerations are also implicit in Opinion 2/13 where the CJEU found that the 
EU accession agreement to the ECHR was not compatible with the EU treaties.  
 
Key words: judicial dialogue – Court of Justice of the European Union - European Court of 
Human Rights – Charter of Fundamental Rights – Opinion 2/13  
                                                          
1 I would like to thank Malu Beijer, Gráinne De Búrca, Janneke Gerards, Lize Glas, John Morijn and Marc 
Veenbrink as well as the two anonymous peer reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier versions. 
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Much has been written about the judicial dialogue and interaction between the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Right (ECtHR) in 
Strasbourg. The CJEU and the ECtHR have been referred to as ‘twins separated at birth’2 who 
have been ‘living apart together’.3 No other body of ‘foreign’ case law has been cited on such 
a frequent basis by the CJEU and several observers noted that the CJEU has in practice 
operated as if it were already a party to the ECHR.4 Yet, relatively little is known about the 
actual practice at the CJEU and the way in which the case law of the ECtHR is used by 
judges, Advocates General (AGs) and référendaires. Most scholars have examined only one 
aspect of the CJEU’s reliance on ECtHR, which is arguably the most visible: the express 
references to judgments of the ECtHR in judgments. But even here, there is disagreement 
about the frequency of such explicit citation post-Lisbon after the entry into force of the 
Charter.5 Some commentators argue, on the one hand, that the Charter has actually solidified 
the practice of ‘cross-fertilisation’ and ‘parallel interpretation’ and that the CJEU has 
examined the case law of the ECtHR in more detail, in line with the ‘homogeneity clause’ of 
Article 52(3) of the Charter and Article 6(3) TEU.6 Other commentators argue, on the other 
hand, that the CJEU has increasingly relied on its ‘own’ instrument and developed an 
autonomous interpretation thereof and they expect that the Charter will eventually sideline the 
ECHR and the ECtHR.7 Opinion 2/13, where the CJEU held that the agreement on the 
                                                          
2 G. Quinn, ‘The European Union and the Council of Europe on the Issue of Human Rights: Twins Separated at 
Birth?’, McGill Law Journal, vol. 46 (2001), 849-874.   
3 B. de Witte, ‘The use of the ECHR and Convention case law by the European Court of Justice’, in P. Popelier 
et al. (eds), Human rights protection in the European legal order: the interaction between the European and the 
national courts (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2011), 17-34, 17.  
4 A. Rosas, ‘The European Court of Justice in context: forms and patterns of judicial dialogue’,  European 
Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 1, no. 2 (2007), 10. De Witte, n 3 supra, 18. 
5 Note that the text of the Charter was already adopted and officially proclaimed on 7 December 2000 in Nice. 
Most of the text has remained unchanged, except for the horizontal provisions governing the Charter’s 
interpretation and application in Title VII. Article 6(1) TEU provides that the Charter ‘shall have the same legal 
value as the Treaties’. 
6 For the terms ‘cross-fertilisation’ and ‘parallel interpretation’, see respectively F. G. Jacobs, ‘Judicial dialogue 
and the cross-fertilization of legal systems: the European Court of Justice’, Texas International Law Journal, 
vol. 38 (2003), 547-556. Joint communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris, 24 January 2011, at: 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-02/cedh_cjue_english.pdf [last accessed 4 May 
2015], para. 1. See also C. Eckes, ‘The Court of Justice’s participation in the judicial discourse: theory and 
practice’, in M. Cremona and A. Thies (eds), The European Court of Justice and External Relations - 
Constitutional Challenges (Oxford: Hart, 2014). T. Marguery, ‘European Union Fundamental Rights and 
Member States Action in EU Criminal Law’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, vol. 20, 
no. 2 (2013), 282-301, 285.  
7 L. Scheeck, ‘Diplomatic intrusions, dialogues and fragile equilibria: the European Court as a constitutional 
actor of the European Union’, in J. Christoffersen and M.R. Madsen (eds), The European Court of Human Rights 
between Law and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011), 164-180, 165. De Witte, n 3 supra, 33. G. de 
Búrca, ‘After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: the Court of Justice as a human rights adjudicator’, 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, vol. 20, no. 2 (2013), 168-184, 172. J. Polakiewicz, ‘EU 
and the ECHR: will EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights square the circle’, at: 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2331497 [last accessed 4 May 2015], 6. C. Timmermans, ‘Will the 
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accession of the EU to the ECHR was not compatible with Article 6(2) TEU,  seems to lend 
further credence to the latter proposition.  
This article seeks to unravel the practice of the CJEU with respect to the discussion 
and citation of the ECtHR by actually asking those who should have the best direct 
knowledge of what is happening: those working in the Court of Justice themselves. More 
specifically it aims to answer the following research questions for the post-Lisbon period after 
1 December 2009: To what extent does the CJEU examine or discuss the case law of the 
ECtHR in cases dealing with fundamental rights in the deliberative phase preceding the actual 
judgment? Why is Strasbourg explicitly cited in some cases, while not in others? What are the 
reasons for (not) doing so? In order to answer these questions interviews with former and 
sitting judges, AGs and référendaires were conducted at the CJEU in December 2014. The 
author interviewed 20 persons: two former and seven sitting judges, seven référendaires of 
judges, three référendaires of AGs and one AG.8 The reason for conducting the interviews is 
that the research questions cannot be answered solely on the basis of an analysis of written 
documents available, including the judgments of the CJEU and the Opinions of the AGs as 
well as scholarly literature addressing this matter. What is more, the rationale behind the 
interviews is that the way in which courts examine and cite judgments of other (international) 
courts depends very much on the attitudes, preferences and personal interests of individual 
judges and legal secretaries.9 This is the first scholarly work that examines the actual practice 
of the use of Strasbourg case law by Luxemburg on the basis of interviews with CJEU 
officials in the post-Lisbon period.10 This article does not pretend to give an all-exhaustive 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
accession of the EU to the ECHR fundamentally change the relationship between the Luxemburg and the 
Strasbourg Courts?’, CJC Distinguished Lecture 2014/01, 12. 
8 See n 11 infra for the selection of interviewees. All the interviews were held in Luxembourg on 8-10 December 
2014, except for three which were conducted via telephone beforehand. The interviews thus took place before 
Opinion 2/13, which was therefore not touched upon during the interviews. Each interview took on average 
between 45 minutes and 1 hour. Most interviews were taped after the consent of the interviewee. A list of 
questions was sent beforehand. In order to protect the anonymity of the interviewees, their names and identities 
will not be disclosed. Instead, a randomly generated series of letters were assigned to the interviewees and used 
for reference. 
9 N. Krisch, ‘The open architecture of European human rights law’, The Modern Law Review, vol. 71, no. 2 
(2008), 183-216, 211-213. E. Mak, ‘Why do Dutch and UK judges cite foreign law’, The Cambridge Law 
Journal, vol. 70, no. 2 (2011), 420-450, 421. M. Gelter and M. M. Siems, ‘Citations to foreign courts – 
illegitimate and superfluous, or unavoidable? Evidence from Europe’, American Journal of Comparative Law, 
vol. 62 (2014), 35-85, 84. C. McCrudden, ‘Using comparative reasoning in human rights adjudication: the Court 
of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights compared’, Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies, vol. 15 (2012-2013), 384-415, 403.  
10 There have been two research projects from before and shortly after the entering into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty. What distinguishes the present research is that it is focused on the actual use made of the ECtHR case 
law by the CJEU (one way) instead of the more general relationship between both courts (both ways). Scheeck 
conducted more than 80 interviews with a wide variety of different EU and Council of Europe actors in Brussels, 
Luxembourg and Strasbourg from April 2002 to June 2007. L. Scheeck, ‘Competition, conflict and cooperation 
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account representative of the entire CJEU, especially because only a limited number of 
persons out of a much wider range of CJEU officials was actually interviewed.11 In order to 
avoid that the information-base is too anecdotal, this article will primarily discuss the 
commonalities between the several interviewees and integrate -where possible- the interview 
data into the existing scholarly literature as well as the actual case law of the CJEU. This 
article does not intend to give a normative account by discussing whether the interaction 
between both courts and the express citation of Strasbourg is useful or desirable.12 
This article has the following structure. Section 1 sketches a historical and legal 
background by shortly examining the CJEU’s practice of referring to ECtHR case law pre-
Lisbon. It then offers a legal analysis of the question whether the CJEU based on the Lisbon-
Treaty and the EU Charter is (already) bound by the ECHR and the judgments of the ECtHR 
prior to accession of the EU to the ECHR. The second and third sections are focused on the 
actual ‘methodology’ of the CJEU and the way in which the case law of the ECtHR is used in 
practice post-Lisbon. These sections are primarily based upon the above mentioned interviews 
with judges, référendaires and AGs of the CJEU. Section 2 looks at the deliberative and 
heuristic phase. It will, firstly, examine the way in which the case law of the ECtHR is 
examined and discussed by CJEU judges and référendaires (how?) and, secondly, which 
factors make that the CJEU analyses Strasbourg case law or not (why?). Section 3 focuses on 
the eventual judgment of the CJEU. Section 3.1 focuses on the way in which the case law of 
the ECtHR has featured in the judgments of the CJEU post-Lisbon and reflects on the above 
mentioned conflicting propositions as to the frequency of ECtHR citations  (how?). Section 
3.2 discusses the reasons for citing Strasbourg in specific cases (why?).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
between European courts and the diplomacy of supranational judicial networks’, GARNET Working Paper 
23/07, 3. Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis conducted interviews with 13 judges and 6 AGs at the CJEU in 
October and December 2010 which were primarily focused on the accession of the EU to the ECHR. S. Morano-
Foadi and S. Andreadakis, ‘A report on the protection of fundamental rights in Europe: a reflection on the 
relationship between the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights’ 
(2014), at: https://dm.coe.int/CED20140017597 [last accessed 4 May 2015]. 
11 Seven out of the 28 sitting judges were interviewed, as well as seven out of 86 référendaires of judges. In 
addition, only one of the nine AGs and three out of the 36 référendaires of AGs were interviewed. Persons were 
chosen and contacted on the basis of their expertise on fundamental rights/ ECHR and their (academic) writing 
about the topic of the dialogue between the CJEU and the ECtHR. These persons were also asked whether they 
had any recommendations for other persons (snowballing effect). The inclusion of CJEU officials with relatively 
extensive knowledge about fundamental rights or the ECHR also means that primarily those officials that are 
most aware of the ECtHR case law and the dialogue with Strasbourg were included. The interview data could 
thus be biased towards a greater impact of Strasbourg. Note that this article only looks to the practice of the 
Court of Justice and not the General Court or the Civil Service Tribunal.  
12 For an example of a more normative approach, see G. Harpaz, ‘The European Court of Justice and its relations 
with the European Court of Human Rights: the quest for enhanced reliance, coherence and legitimacy’, Common 
Market Law Review, vol. 46 (2009), 105-141. 
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1. The historical and legal context 
 
1.1. The historical context: the pre-Lisbon citation of the case law of the ECtHR by the 
CJEU 
Several reviews have been given of the reliance of the CJEU on the case law of the ECtHR. It 
is not the point of this article to repeat them.13 A short background sketch is, however, 
indispensable to understand the current post-Lisbon situation. The first mention of the ECHR 
was in 1975 in Rutili.14 The first explicit reference to the ECtHR was more than twenty years 
later in 1996 in P&S, one month after Opinion 2/94 in which the CJEU underlined that the EU 
was not competent to accede to the ECHR.15 The CJEU’s reliance on the ECHR and the 
ECtHR pre-Lisbon was primarily driven by the ‘demands’ of national (constitutional) courts 
to have the CJEU take fundamental rights more seriously.16 In the absence of an EU 
fundamental rights charter, the CJEU could use the EC(t)HR to fill this void.17 The EC(t)HR 
was more useful than the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, because it 
offered a ready-made European consensus.18 The rather late explicit citation of Strasbourg 
does, however, not necessarily mean that the ECtHR had not been of any influence on the 
CJEU before 1996. There has certainly been an implicit influence. Jacobs, for example, 
argued that the CJEU borrowed the doctrine of impossibility of retroactive effect of court 
judgments in Defrenne II from the ECtHR.19 Moreover, Opinions of AGs started to discuss 
the case law already in the late 1980s and it is not unreasonable to assume that they have had 
an effect on judges and judgments, as will be discussed further below.20    
The initial references to the ECtHR as a ‘source of inspiration’ were rather short.21 
Soon, the CJEU began citing ECtHR judgments more frequently and in a more detailed way, 
                                                          
13 De Witte, n 3 supra, 25.  
14 Case 36/75, Rutili [1975] 1219. 
15 Case 13/94, P & S  [1996] I-2143. 
16 K. Schiemann, ‘A response to The judge as comparatist’, Tulane Law Review, vol. 80 (2005-2006), 281-297, 
286. S. Douglas-Scott, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights 
after Lisbon’, in S. De Vries et al. (eds), The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU after Lisbon (Oxford: 
Hart 2013), 153-179, 163. 
17 S. Douglas-Scott, ‘A tale of two courts: Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the growing European human rights 
acquis’, Common Market Law Review, vol. 43 (2006), 629-665, 653-654. 
18 A. Rosas and L. Armati, EU Constitutional Law. An introduction (Oxford: Hart, 2012), 168.  
19 Case 43/75, Defrenne v Sabena [1976] 455. Jacobs, n 6 supra, 552. 
20 N 196 infra. 
21 Douglas-Scott, n 17 supra, 645. 
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by also engaging with the grounds of justifications.22 Several observers noted that the CJEU 
started to drop the ‘special significance’ terminology and began referring to the ECHR 
directly in the same way as if referring to its own judgments.23 The use of the case law of the 
ECtHR by the CJEU increasingly went beyond a mere inspirational use and seemed to take 
the case law of the ECtHR not only as a persuasive source, but as de facto binding by literally 
copying Strasbourg’s interpretation without much criticism as if it were the CJEU’s own 
precedents.24 One of the most prominent examples of the reliance on the ECtHR, where the 
CJEU ‘scrupulously’ followed the ECHR, is Connolly where it applied the Handyside 
principles of the ECtHR with respect to limitations under Article 10 ECHR (freedom of 
expression).25 
This short pre-Lisbon overview shows that the CJEU has examined and referred to the 
case law of the ECtHR rather extensively and in that way has treated the judgments of the 
ECtHR as if they are practically binding.26 Furthermore, actual differences and conflicts 
between both courts have been extremely rare. Former AG Jacobs (1988-2006), for example, 
could not think of a single case in which the CJEU evidently went against the interpretation of 
the ECtHR.27 This is somehow surprising given that the CJEU is not formally bound by the 
ECHR and the interpretation of the ECtHR, as will be sketched in the next subsection.  
 
                                                          
22 One example is Case 465/00, Österreichischer Rundfunk [2003] I-04989. S. Peers and S. Prechal, ‘Article 52’, 
in in S. Peers et al. (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Oxford, Hart 2014), para 
52.20. See also Krisch, n 9 supra, 199. Douglas-Scott, n 17 supra, 645. 
23 Examples include Case 341/06 P, Chronopost [2008] I-04777, paras. 46 and 54. Joined Cases 482/01 and 
493/01, Orfanopoulos [2004] ECR I-05257, para. 99. Case 465/07, Elgafaji [2009] I-00921. Case 450/06, Varec 
[2008] I-00581, paras. 44-48. De Witte, n 3 supra, 23. Eckes, n 6 supra.  
24 In some cases, the CJEU incorporated the Strasbourg approach without elaborating upon the suitability of 
directly translating it into the –different- EU context. H. Senden, Interpretation of fundamental rights in a 
multilevel Legal system. An analysis of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (Antwerp: Intersentia 2011), 356-358. 
25 Case 274/99 P, Connolly v Commission [2001] I-01611. Handyside v the United Kingdom, ECHR [1976] 
5493. Peers and Prechal, n 22 supra, para 52.23. W. Weiβ, ‘Human Rights in the EU: Rethinking the Role of the 
European Convention on Human Rights after Lisbon’, European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 7, no. 1 
(2011), 64-95, 80.  
26 Interview R. Former CJEU Judge Timmermans (2000-2010) held that the treatment of the Strasbourg case law 
by the CJEU comes close to that of being directly bound. Timmermans, n 7 supra, 9. De Witte, n 3 supra, 24 and 
34. Krisch, n 9 supra, 201. 
27 The only case mentioned during the interviews where the CJEU gave an interpretation which did not follow 
the ECtHR was Emesa Sugar, where the CJEU denied parties a right to comment on the AG’s Opinion. Case 
17/98, Emesa Sugar [2000] I-00675. Interview U. De Witte, n 3 supra, 25. Douglas-Scott, n 17 supra, 648. S. 
Iglesias Sánchez, ‘The Court and the Charter: The impact of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on the 
ECJ’s approach to fundamental rights’, Common Market Law Review, vol. 49, no. 5, (2012), 1565-1611, 1602. 
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1.2. The legal context: is the EU bound by the ECHR and the interpretation of the ECtHR 
prior to accession? 
The EU is not yet legally bound to the ECHR prior to accession. In the post-Lisbon case of 
Åkerberg Fransson, and subsequent cases such as Kone and Schindler, the CJEU determined 
that the ECHR ‘does not constitute, as long as the European Union has not acceded to it, a 
legal instrument which has been formally incorporated into European Union law’.28 Only 
after accession would the ECtHR’s interpretation of the ECHR be binding upon the EU as the 
CJEU also suggested in Opinion 2/13.29 Likewise, CJEU Judge Rosas held extrajudicially that 
because the EU is not yet a party to the ECHR, the ECHR is ‘not a binding Community law 
instrument but plays a role rather as an authoritative guideline for determining the general 
principles of Community Law which the court applies’.30 The CJEU’s interpretation has been 
questioned by some from the point of view of Article 6(3) TEU.31 De Witte argued that from 
the point of view of Union law, the EU is bound by the ECHR, because Article 6(3) TEU 
underlines that the provisions of the ECHR are general principles and not just sources for 
identifying them. Some judgments could be interpreted as giving (implicit) backing to this 
reading as well.32 De Witte, however, also recognised that Article 6(3) TEU does not make 
the ECHR applicable as such, but only via the general principles of EU law as intermediates. 
He attributed the different opinion of the CJEU -and much of the literature- to the fact that the 
Court only looks to whether the EU is bound by the ECHR under international law (which it 
is not) and not whether it is already bound under EU law (which it is, according to De Witte).   
Another question, in addition to the question whether the EU is bound by the ECHR, 
is whether the CJEU is bound by the interpretation of the ECtHR in the current situation 
without formal accession.33 At a first glance, this question seems simple even though the 
                                                          
28 Case 617/10, Åkerberg Fransson [2013] nyr, para. 44. Case 510/11 P, Kone v Commission [2013] nyr, para. 
21. C-501/11 P, Schindler v Commission [2013] nyr. This has, however, not prevented the CJEU from explicitly 
referring to the case law of the ECtHR in the latter two cases. See also Case 571/10, Kamberaj [2012] nyr, para. 
60. 
29 Opinion 2/13 [2014] nyr, para. 185.  
30 Rosas noted the ‘semi-vertical relationship’ between the CJEU and ECtHR which goes further than a situation 
where the CJEU ‘may’ take into account another court’s case law. The CJEU ‘should’ take the case law into 
account, but it is not a ‘must’ or ‘shall’. Rosas, n 4 supra, 8 and 15. 
31 De Witte, n 3 supra, 21-22. 
32 The CJEU noted in Elgafaji that ‘the ECHR forms part of the general principles of Community law’. Case 
465/07, Elgafaji [2009] I-00921, para. 28. In addition, the CJEU held in Kone that ‘Article 6(3) TEU confirms 
[that] fundamental rights recognised by the ECHR constitute general principles’. Case 510/11 P, Kone v 
Commission [2013] nyr, para. 21.   
33 During the hearings in the context of Opinion 2/13 there was ‘extensive discussion’ as to whether the CJEU –
after accession of the EU to the ECHR- could refuse to recognise judgments of the ECtHR where these conflict 
with the constitutional identity of the EU or where they are ultra vires. See AG Kokott in Opinion 2/13 [2014] 
nyr, para. 167-171. The CJEU seemed to imply that such situations might indeed occur, because it held that ‘it 
should not be possible for the ECtHR to call into question the Court’s finding in relation to the scope ratione 
10 
 
CJEU has not really answered that question in very explicit terms.34 It seems logical to 
assume that the CJEU’s Åkerberg logic that it is not bound by the ECHR prior to the EU’s 
accession to the ECHR also extends to interpretations of the same ECHR by the ECtHR. 
Nonetheless, Article 52(3) of the Charter compels the CJEU to interpret the meaning and 
scope of Charter rights, which corresponds to rights in the ECHR, in the same way as the 
ECHR. This Article does not expressly mention that this obligation also extends to the 
judgments of the ECtHR.35 The Explanations, however, mention that ‘the meaning and the 
scope of the guaranteed rights are determined not only by the text of those instruments, but 
also by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights’. The difficulty with the 
Explanations is, however, that these are not legally binding, but should only ‘be given due 
regard’ to on the basis of Articles 52(7) and 6(1) TEU.36 In addition, the obligation in the 
Explanations with respect to the case law of the ECtHR was intentionally not included in the 
Charter itself in order to safeguard the autonomy of the CJEU.37 Douglas-Scott also noted that 
if the ECtHR case law were to be binding, this would introduce the Common Law doctrine of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
materiae of EU law’. Opinion 2/13 [2014] nyr, para. 186. Note that even following accession, the CJEU is still 
not formally bound to the entire case law of the ECtHR, since Article 46(1) ECHR stipulates that judgments are 
binding inter partes (res judicata). In addition, judgment are declaratory in nature. AG Kokott in Opinion 2/13 
[2014] nyr, paras. 78 and 123. See also Kadi I in which the CJEU held that UN Security Council Resolutions 
cannot derogate from the ‘very foundations of the Community legal order’ and cannot have primacy over general 
principles of EU law. Joined Cases 402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi [2008] I-06351, paras. 304-308. ECtHR 
judgments are at the same time considered to have res interpretata, which means that an interpretation of the 
ECHR by the ECtHR that can be generalised beyond the concrete case is part of the ECHR and because of that 
binding on State Parties. A. Bodnar, ‘Res Interpretata: Legal Effect of the European Court of Human Rights’ 
Judgments for other States Than Those Which Were Party to the Proceedings’, Ius Gentium: Comparative 
Perspectives on Law and Justice, vol. 30 (2014), 223-262. 
34 Several commentators observed that the CJEU has not really discussed the status of the ECtHR. Douglas-
Scott, n 17 supra, 651. Harpaz, n 12 supra, 109-110. C. Eckes, ‘EU accession to the ECHR: between autonomy 
and adaptation’, Modern Law Review, vol. 76, no. 2 (2013), 254-285, 284. Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis, n 10 
supra, 37. 
35 Article 52(3) provides: ‘In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those 
rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law 
providing more extensive protection.’ AG Kokott labeled Article 52(3) as a ‘homogeneity clause’. Case 109/10 
P, Solvay v Commission [2011] I-10329, para. 252. Case 110/10 P, Toshiba v Commission [2011] I-10439, 
paraa. 95 and 100. Note that there are twelve Charter rights corresponding with the ECHR and another six which 
corresponds to the ECHR, but which have a wider scope. X. Groussot and E. Gill-Pedro, ‘Old and new human 
rights in Europe. The scope of EU rights versus that of ECHR rights’, in E. Brems and J. Gerards (eds), Shaping 
Rights in the ECHR. The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Determining the Scope of Human 
Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014), 232-258, 235. 
36 Weiβ, however, argued that a teleological interpretation of Article 52(3) would attach binding force to the case 
law of the ECtHR, also because the preamble of the Charter and the Explanations refer to the case law of the 
ECtHR. Weiβ, n 25 supra, 80-81. 
37 Douglas-Scott, n 16 supra, 163. Krisch, n 9 supra, 201. For a full discussion, see J.B. Liisberg, ‘Does the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights threaten the supremacy of Community Law?’, Jean Monnet Working Paper 4/01, 
7-18. 
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stare decisis which is unknown to EU law.38 There are, however, some early Charter cases, 
including DEB and J McB, in which the CJEU held that Article 52(3) extends the obligation 
of conform interpretation to the case law of the ECtHR.39 In J. McB. v L.E., the CJEU held 
that the Charter must ‘be given the same meaning and the same scope as Article 8(1) of the 
ECHR, as interpreted by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights’.40 Also AG 
Cruz Villalón held in European Air Transport that the interpretation of the ECtHR ‘binds the 
European Union and must be taken into account by the Court of Justice’.41 The CJEU 
determined in the more recent case of Arango Jaramillo that ‘reference must be made’ to the 
case law of the ECtHR in accordance with Article 52(3), which, however, seems not to be the 
same as acknowledging the binding force of ECtHR judgments.42 Some (former) CJEU 
judges also proposed -extra judicially- a more extensive interpretation. CJEU Judge Lenaerts 
already held in 2001 that the CJEU ‘will be obliged to take over the interpretation given by 
the ECtHR’, at least for ECHR rights corresponding to the rights in the Charter.43 Former 
CJEU Judge Timmermans also argued that the EU made itself subject (unilaterally) to 
jurisdiction of the ECtHR with the Lisbon Treaty.44  
A third legal question is whether the CJEU is obliged to explicitly cite or refer to the 
case law of the ECtHR. There is no such obligation, which is not surprising in the light of the 
dismissive answer to the previous two questions.45 One interviewee also argued that national 
courts are not explicitly citing Strasbourg since they are equally not obliged to do so.46  
 
                                                          
38 Douglas-Scott, n 16 supra, 163. Judgments of the ECtHR might still have a res interpretata effect. N 33 
supra. Tridimas also noted that even though precedent is no formal source, it has ‘progressively acquired prime 
place in the ‘juristic consciousness’ of EU lawyers’. T. Tridimas, ‘Precedent and the Court of Justice. A 
jurisprudence of doubt’, in J. Dickson and P. Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical Foundations of European Union 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), 307-330, 329.  
39 Case 279/09, DEB [2010] I-13849, para. 35.  
40 Case 400/10 PPU, J. McB. v L.E [2010] I-08965, para. 53. This was interpreted by Craig as given implicit 
support for the wider reading of Article 52(3) as covering the case law of the ECtHR. P. Craig, ‘EU accession to 
the ECHR: competence, procedure and substance’, Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 36 (2013), 1114-
1150, 1149. 
41 He based this conclusion on Article 53 of the Charter. Cruz Villalón in Case 120/10, European Air Transport 
[2011] I-07865, para. 80. Likewise AG Sharpston held that ‘EU law must be interpreted taking into account the 
case-law’ of the ECtHR. Sharpston in Cases 456/12 and 457/12, O. and B. [2014] nyr, para. 64.  
42 Case 334/12 RX-II, Arango Jaramillo [2013] nyr, para. 43. See also Case F-26/12, Maria Concetta Cerafogli v 
European Central Bank [2014] nyr, para. 49. See also AG Mengozzi in Case 382/12 P, Mastercard v 
Commission [2014] nyr, para. 20.  
43 K. Lenaerts and E. De Smijter, ‘The Charter and the role of the European Courts’, Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law, vol. 8 (2001), 90-101, 99. M. Bronckers, ‘The relationship of the EC Courts 
with other international tribunals: non-committal, respectful or submissive?’, Common Market Law Review, vol. 
44 (2007), 601-627, 604-605. 
44 Timmermans, n 7 supra, 11. 
45 De Witte, n 3 supra, 25. Interview M.  
46 Interview C. 
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Some insights from Luxembourg 
Which view is currently predominant in Luxembourg itself with respect to the question as to 
whether the CJEU is bound by the judgments of the ECtHR? The great majority of 
interviewees seemed to follow the Åkerberg line by arguing that the CJEU is not legally 
bound by the case law of the ECtHR prior to the EU’s accession to the ECHR.47 Most 
interviewees, however, noted that the CJEU is at a minimum obliged to ‘take into account’ or 
consider the case law of the ECtHR, on the basis of Article 6(3) TEU and 52(3) Charter.48 
This is an obligation of EU law and not an obligation under the ECHR.49 This obligation of 
merely considering the case law also enables a reflective application of the ECtHR which fits 
the case before the CJEU.50 One interviewee also noted that Article 52(3) leaves a margin of 
appreciation in determining what a corresponding right is and what it means to give a Charter 
right the same meaning and scope as the corresponding ECHR provision.51 The pragmatic and 
case-dependent approach is also visible in the Opinion of AG Trstenjak in O. & B. which 
noted that ‘it would be wrong to regard the case-law of the ECtHR as a source of 
interpretation with full validity’ because of the case-specific nature of the case law.52 
Likewise, AG Cruz Villalón held in Åkerberg that Article 52(3) only contains a qualified 
obligation and proposed a partial autonomous and divergent interpretation from the case law 
of the ECtHR.53 Further support for this approach is the Joint Communication of CJEU 
President Skouris and ECtHR President Costa on accession which merely noted in rather non-
committal terms that ‘parallel interpretation’ under Article 52(3) ‘could prove useful’ and that 
‘greatest coherence’ should be ensured.54 Moreover, the view that the judgments of the 
ECtHR are not legally binding also corresponds with the case law of the CJEU with respect to 
international agreements concluded by the EU. The CJEU has never accepted the binding 
force of decisions of external judicial authorities, especially with a view on autonomy EU 
                                                          
47 Interview D, I, P, R, S, T. One CJEU judge interviewed by Morano-Foadi also held that the CJEU is ‘not 
bound’ by the case law of the ECtHR. Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis, n 10 supra, 44. Weiβ also pointed noted 
that the CJEU still does not feel legally obliged to follow the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR. Weiβ, n 25 
supra, 77 and 79. 
48 Interview A, C, E, I, P, S, T, Q, W, X. One interviewee, however, noted that Article 52(3) has given the case 
law of the ECtHR the status of primary -treaty- law even without the EU’s accession to the ECHR. Interview B. 
49 Interview C and W. 
50 Interview T. 
51 Interview W. 
52 This is somewhat remarkable in the light of her earlier statement that Article 52(3) must be ‘construed as an 
essentially dynamic reference which, in principle, covers the case-law of the ECtHR’. Sharpston in Cases 456/12 
and 457/12, O. and B. [2014] nyr, paras. 145 and 146.  
53 He noted that this is possible when the ECHR (and Protocol 7) is not fully incorporated into national law in all 
Member States: ‘the protective threshold which the Court of Justice is required to respect must be the result of an 
independent interpretation which is based exclusively on the wording and scope of Article 50 of the Charter.’ 
Case 617/10, Åkerberg Fransson [2013] nyr, paras. 81-88. 
54 Joint communication, n 6 supra, para. 1. 
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legal order, which is also stressed in the Explanations to Article 52(3).55 Kadi I and Opinion 
2/13 imply that the CJEU is reluctant to tie its own hand so that it maintains the possibility to 
give its own divergent interpretation.56 This is also in line with the way the CJEU treats 
Strasbourg, as we saw in section 1.2 (see also section 3.1). The CJEU has generally used the 
case law of the ECtHR indirectly as a source of inspiration (‘by analogy’) instead of a source 
which gives guidance in a coercive sense.57 The CJEU does so with a view of keeping 
Strasbourg outside the EU legal order and in order to underline that cases in Luxembourg are 
different.58  
 
2. The CJEU’s methodology  
Several scholars have criticised the inconsistencies and the apparent absence of a method and 
explanation in the reliance on the case law of the ECtHR by the CJEU.59 Douglas-Scott, for 
example, labeled the practice as ‘messy, unpredictable and complex’, while De Búrca pointed 
to the ‘increasingly selective’ use of Strasbourg and the ‘detached, autonomous and 
potentially uninformed case law’ of the CJEU with respect to fundamental right.60 Similar 
observations have been put forward with  respect to the CJEU’s reliance on its own case 
law.61 Several interviews agreed with the absence of a uniform practice, which was 
considered inherent in any institution where human beings work.62 Interviewees confirmed 
that there is no general orientation, decision or plan within the CJEU on how to deal with the 
case law of the ECtHR. Rather, a step-by-step or spontaneous approach applies.63 The 
attention that is being paid to a legal source, including the case law of the ECtHR, also 
                                                          
55 The Explanations to Article 52(3) stipulate that: ‘without thereby adversely affecting the autonomy of Union 
law and of that of the Court of Justice of the European Union.’ Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079 and Opinion 
1/09 [2014] nyr. Eckes, n 34 supra, 259-260.  
56 In Kadi I, the CJEU described the EC Treaty as ‘an autonomous legal system which is not to be prejudiced by 
an international agreement’. Joined Cases 402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi [2008] I-06351, para. 316. Senden, n 
24 supra, 362. Harpaz, n 12 supra,  110.  
57 Interview O. L. Scheeck, ‘Solving Europe’s binary human rights puzzle. The interaction between 
supranational courts as a parameter of European governance’, Questions de Recherche, no. 15 (2005), 21. 
58 Ibid. 
59 De Witte for example referred to the ‘eclectic and unsystematic’ approach. De Witte, n 3 supra, 19. Tulkens 
referred to Luxembourg’s ‘a la carte’ use of ECHR. Scheeck, n 57 supra, 24. 
60 Often the ECtHR is cited, without discussing the facts of the case.  Douglas-Scott, n 17 supra, 657-658 and 
665. De Búrca, n 7 supra, 173-174. 
61 Interview R. Tridimas qualified this practice as ‘selective and superficial’. Tridimas, n 38 supra, 314-315 and 
326. 
62 Interview D, N, O, S, U.  
63 Interview B, C, O, U, V. 
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depends upon the composition of a Chamber and the dynamics within a certain formation.64 
There is, thus, not one unanimous opinion of ‘the’ CJEU, because there are different persons 
and formations.65  
This section discusses how the case law of the ECtHR is used by the CJEU by 
distinguishing between, on the one hand, the deliberative and heuristic phase during which the 
law is ‘discovered’ and a decision comes into being, and, on the other hand, the process of 
justification of the court’s decision in the eventual judgment.66 This distinction is based on the 
possibility that judgments of the ECtHR are examined by the CJEU during the deliberative 
phase, but not explicitly referred to in a judgment. Not everything that has been considered by 
the CJEU ends up in judgment.67 CJEU Judge Lenaerts, for example held that the CJEU’s 
research of ECtHR case law has often backed up a judgment of the CJEU but ‘rarely 
transpires directly in the reasoning’.68 
 
2.1. How? The way in which the case law of the ECtHR is examined in the deliberative 
phase 
From the interviews it has become apparent that there is no formal mechanisms in the form of 
a standard format, guidelines or a separate department following the case law of the ECtHR 
that ensures that the case law of the ECtHR is duly taken into account.69 This means that there 
is not a systematic method that is used by all judges and référendaires. Most interviewees, 
however, stated on the basis of their experience that the case law of the ECtHR is (almost) 
always -at least- considered or examined when a case concerns fundamental rights.70 They, 
however, noted the tendency to start with the Charter as the primary point of reference, 
                                                          
64 Interview B, E, N, O, U, W. Note, however, that there are several mechanisms to try to avoid inconsistencies; 
Vice-President and President who read all judgments. Lecteurs d’arrets who proofread all judgments and their 
uniformity with respect to the formal aspects. The Grand Chamber is another ‘mechanism’ that makes for 
coherence, because it eventually involves all the Judges in the debate. Interview B, C and V. 
65 Even the Grand Chamber has slightly more than halve of all judges involved. Interview N. See also M. 
Malecki, ‘Do ECJ judges all speak with the same voice? Evidence of divergent preferences from the judgments 
of chambers’, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 19, no. 1 (2012), 59-75. 
66 J. Bell, ‘The argumentatitve status of foreign Legal arguments’, Utrecht Law Review, vol. 8, no. 2 (2012), 8-
19, 12. Mak, n 9 supra, 420. 
67 Interview I, P, X. 
68 K. Lenaerts, ‘Interlocking Legal orders in the European Union and comparative law’, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 52 (2003), 873-906, 873-875. See also C. McCrudden, ‘A common law of 
human rights? Transnational judicial conversations on constitutional rights’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
vol. 20, no. 4 (2000), 499-532, 511-512. Schiemann, n 16 supra, 286. De Búrca, n 7 supra, 178. 
69 Interview B, M, N, Q, Z. 
70 Interview A, C, D, E, O, P, R, S, T, V. It could obviously happen that judgments of ECtHR are simply 
overlooked. Interview W. 
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because this is considered the most up-to-date fundamental rights catalogue.71 One 
interviewee, nonetheless, admitted that the case law of the ECtHR may be studied less given 
the tendency to rely primarily upon the Charter and CJEU’s own case law.72 Some 
interviewees also noted that the examination of the case law of the ECtHR has recently been 
more in the form of a compatibility check at the end, as will be discussed later.73 Most 
commentators and interviewees noted that the AG usually examines and discusses the case 
law of the ECtHR more extensively than the CJEU.74 The interviewees considered this a 
logical phenomenon given the different function of the AG and the fact that the AG has more 
freedom and time.75 That is to say, the AG adopts a more analytical or academic approach and 
looks to the broader context to give reflections and alternative solutions that could enrich the 
legal debate. What is more, the AG does not have to compromise as the CJEU does.76 One 
thing that is obvious, but what is nonetheless worth mentioning explicitly is that the CJEU 
does not solely rely on the work of the AG, but that it also conducts its own analysis of 
ECtHR caw law independently. The CJEU, for example, referred to judgments of the ECtHR 
that were not mentioned in the Opinion of the AG.77   
Several interviewees noted that it is not only specific judgments of the ECtHR that 
have an impact, but rather the fundamental rights values and principles that are expressed in 
the case law of the ECtHR more generally. These values are always in the mind of those 
working at the CJEU  and have an implicit influence on the way in which the CJEU handles 
certain cases.78 The mindset of CJEU officials is shaped by a lifetime of reflection or 
education on human rights law of which the case law ECtHR obviously forms part.79 Some 
interviews reframed this argument and argued that they are not concerned with the case law of 
the ECtHR very much, because they were of the opinion that the CJEU would spontaneously 
or independently reach the same outcome as the ECtHR, because the principles of the ECHR 
are ingrained in their way of thinking and the EC(t)HR is based on the same legal sources and 
                                                          
71 Interview C, D, E, I, N, Q, V, W. Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis, n 10 supra, 26-27. G. Arestis, 
‘Fundamental rights in the EU: three years after Lisbon, the Luxembourg perspective’,  College of Europe 
research papers, no. 2 (2013). Joint communication, n 6 supra, para. 1. 
72 Interview W. 
73 Interview C, V.  
74 Douglas-Scott, n 17 supra, 647. G. de Baere, ‘The Court of Justice of the EU as a European and international 
asylum court’, Working paper no. 118 (2013), 12-14. Iglesias Sánchez, n 27 supra, 1603. 
75 Interview B, C, E, I, N, O, P, V, Z. 
76 Interview T. 
77 Case 229/05, Ocalan v Council [2007] I-00439. Case 450/06, Varec [2008] I-00581. C-300/11, ZZ [2013] nyr. 
C-220/13, Nikolau [2014] nyr. Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland [2014] nyr. 
Likewise, there are cases without an AG Opinion that refer to the case law of the ECtHR. Case 168/13 PPU, 
Jeremy F [2013] nyr. Case 510/11 P, Kone v Commission [2013] nyr. 
78 Interview N, S, U, V, Z. Douglas-Scott, n 17 supra, 660.  
79 Interview N. 
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legal traditions.80 One interviewee likewise noted that there is no need to study specific 
judgments of the ECtHR, because of the assumption that the CJEU’s own interpretation 
would automatically go beyond the interpretation of Strasbourg.81  
It is primarily up to the référendaires to make sure that everything, including any 
relevant case law, is thoroughly considered.82 Judges sometimes ask their référendaires to do 
(additional) research on ECtHR case law, but this does not seem to happen very often.83 
Référendaires –but also some judges- have used the case law database of the ECtHR 
(HUDOC)84 and look in ECHR commentaries or scholarly literature.85 Some interviewees 
noted that they sometimes might phone a friend or (former) colleague in Strasbourg.86 One 
reason for this was that the ECtHR website and HUDOC database are considered difficult to 
navigate and less user friendly than Curia, the CJEU’s database.87 Another practical difficulty 
is that several important commentaries on ECHR are already outdated.88 Hence, it is difficult 
for judges and référendaires to be sure that they have found all the relevant and recent cases of 
the ECtHR for a given case.  
The CJEU, more specifically the General Meeting of the Court, during which all 
Judges, AGs and the Registrar are present, has the option to request a ‘note de recherche’ 
from the Research and Documentation Department. This is usually a comparative law note on 
the legislation or legal practice in different Member States.89 Some interviewees noted that 
the Court is generally reluctant to ask a note given the limited resources, so it would only do 
so when it is strictly necessary for solving the case.90 Almost all interviewees held that they 
                                                          
80 Interview T and U. 
81 Interview C. 
82 Interview D, N, P, T, X, W. See also Douglas-Scott, n 17 supra, 658.  
83 Interview B, D, O, T, V, W. It depends very much on individual Judges whether they give their référendaires 
detailed instructions. Interview U. What could also happen is that a Judge and his/her référendaire discuss a case 
jointly and one of them could come up with a Strasbourg-related question and jointly decide that this should be 
further examined by the reféréndaire. Interview Q, Z. 
84 Interview D, T, V, Z. 
85 Interview A, W, Z. One interviewed judge held that he/she himself/ herself has not looked at the case law 
ECtHR a lot and guessed that this was  less than once a year. Interview N. 
86 Interview W. Some, however, told that they have never done this when asked about it. Interview A, O and T. 
One interviewee has not done this either, but was aware that this sometimes happens. Interview U.  
87 Interview E, R, W. See also AG Kokott in Opinion 2/13 [2014], para. 224. 
88 Interview R.  
89 These notes usually do not deal with fundamental right issues. Interview Z. De Búrca, n 7 supra, 179. Two 
examples were given during which such a note was requested. Firstly, state liability in case of infringements of 
EU law attributable to national courts.  Case 224/01, Köbler [2003] I-10239. Secondly, the definition of the 
concept of human embryo in Case 34/10, Brüstle [2011] I-09821. Interview B and N 
90 Interview O, Z. Judge Prechal also referred to the limited resources in ‘Interview with Judge Sacha Prechal’,  
19 December 2013, at: http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=2118 [last accessed 4 May 2015]. The Research and 
Documentation Department writes a preliminary note about new incoming cases in which they shortly explain 
what the case is about in 1-1.5 pages. The Department makes references to the relevant case law of the CJEU 
and increasingly –after having been encouraged to do so- case law of other (inter)national courts, such as the 
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have never seen a request which specifically deals with the case law of the ECtHR.91 This is 
also not necessary because the case law of ECtHR is –despite the critical observations above- 
still relatively manageable and easily accessible via HUDOC, at least in comparison with the 
case law of national courts in some Member States.92 Some interviewees noted that the 
practice of the ECtHR, or the practice of third countries, usually Commonwealth countries or 
the International Court of Justice, is, however, looked at in the context of a comparative law 
note from time to time.93  
During the interview, some observations were also made about the deliberations 
themselves, even though the interviewees noted the private and secret nature of those 
meetings.94 Several interviewees noted that there is not much discussion about the case law of 
the ECtHR. The case law of the ECtHR is not considered to be a reason for principled 
discussions.95 It does not happen frequently that there is (oral) debate about the case law of 
the ECtHR in the deliberé.96 Occasionally a judge might warn that a certain point could be 
problematic in the light of the case law of the ECtHR or he/she might refer to ECtHR case 
law in amendments to the draft judgment.97 Interviewees referred to the following instances 
where there was actually some debate. In Akzo Nobel, which dealt with the question whether 
the legal professional privilege also extended to in-house lawyers, there was discussion in the 
deliberé about Article 6 ECHR and the case law of ECtHR on two occasions. This extensive 
discussion was considered to be relatively rare.98 Likewise, Strasbourg was also debated 
lengthily in Court in the citizenship case of ZZ after discussions about it during the oral 
hearing..99 Strasbourg was also discussed in Sky Österreich.100 The ECtHR also had an added 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ECtHR. Interview W. One interviewee noted that the contribution of these notes is limited, because they are not 
always complete and reliable. Interview O.  
91 Interview B, M, N, Q.  
92 Interview B, O, Z. 
93 Interview B, Q. See, however, interview N. 
94 The judge rapporteur could also organise a tour de table on an earlier occasion when (s)he disagrees with the 
Opinion of the AG or has hesitations. This tour de table is focused very much on outcome of the case and not so 
much the reasoning. Other judges sometimes refer to more recent or relevant cases of the CJEU, and 
occasionally the ECtHR. Interview B, N, V, W. Interviewee W noted that the case law of the ECtHR could play 
a role as well, but (s)he could not remember an instance. 
95 Interview C, N, V, W, Z. 
96 Interview A, B, Q,. One interviewee, however, argued that it could be presumed that once the AG discusses 
the case law of the ECtHR, this is also touched upon in the deliberé. Interview I. The practice of cross-
fertilisation is seldomly problematised by the participants in the two systems. McCrudden, n 9 supra, 390. 
97 Interview B, V. 
98 Interview A. Case 550/07 P, Akzo Nobel v Commission [2010] I-08301. The judgment did not cite the 
ECtHR, but AG Kokott did.  
99 Only a passing reference to ECtHR was made in the judgment. The CJEU determined that Article 47 Charter 
requires that when national authorities restrict the freedom of movement and residence of Union citizens, they 
must disclose to the person concerned, precisely and in full, the grounds on which that decision was taken and 
the related evidence limited to that which is strictly necessary. De Boer held that the CJEU’s approach is clearly 
18 
 
value in debates among judges in the Kadi cases, about the freezing of assets of an alleged 
supporter of Al-Qaida, and Digital Rights Ireland, about the conformity of the Data Retention 
Directive with the right to privacy and data protection.101 
In sum, the case law of the ECtHR is almost always examined when a case touches 
upon fundamental rights, primarily by the référendaire(s) of the Reporting Judge. What 
happens less often is that Strasbourg is discussed among judges in the deliberé.  
 
2.2 Why? Reasons why the case law of the ECtHR is examined (or not) in the deliberative 
phase 
The absence of a formal mechanism begs the question as to what makes that the CJEU 
examines the case law of the ECtHR in a particular case? The examination of Strasbourg is 
primarily driven by the preoccupation of the CJEU to prevent an open conflict with the 
ECtHR.102 CJEU Judge Prechal referred to the ‘search for convergence’103, while former  
CJEU Judge Puissochet held that the CJEU is ‘extremely careful’ not to distance itself from 
ECtHR case law.104 The inclination to avoid conflicting judgments was also confirmed by 
almost all interviewees.105 What is more, there is also a certain willingness among CJEU 
judges in assisting Member States in fulfilling their obligations under both EU law and the 
ECHR. CJEU Judge Lenaerts, for example, noted with reference to N.S. that it is important to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
inspired by the ECtHR who applies a similar distinction between the grounds for the decision and the evidence 
for it. N. de Boer, ‘Secret evidence and due process rights under EU law: ZZ’,  Common Market Law Review, 
vol. 51, no. 4 (2014), 1235–1262, 1256. According to the interviewee, the (intervening) parties simply argued 
that the practice of the UK was consistent with the case law of the ECtHR, but they did not explain the case law 
of the ECtHR sufficiently. Interview O. 
100 Case 283/11, Sky Österreich [2013] nyr. Again, the judgment did not refer to the ECtHR. Interview O. This 
case was a request for a preliminary ruling by an Austrian court as to whether the requirement of Directive 
2010/13/EU for holders of exclusive broadcasting rights to authorise any other broadcaster to make short news 
reports, without compensation exceeding the additional costs incurred in providing access to the signal was valid 
in the light of the right to property as laid down in Article 17 Charter and Article 1 of Additional Protocol No 1 
to the ECHR and the freedom to conduct a business, Article 16 Charter. Hins noted that the approach of the 
CJEU corresponds to the ECtHR’s interpretation. W. Hins, ‘The freedom to conduct a business and the right to 
receive information for free: Sky Österreich’, Common Market Law Review, vol. 51, no. 2 (2014), 665–677, 673. 
101 Interview B and O respectively. Joined Cases 402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi [2008] I-06351. Joined Cases 
293/12 and 594/12, Digital Rights Ireland [2014] nyr 
102 Former CJEU Judge Arestis held that the CJEU is ‘very concerned with the consistency of its judgments’ 
with the case-law ECtHR. Arestis, n 71 supra, 13. Schiemann, n 16 supra, 285. The Joint Communication from 
Presidents Costa and Skouris pointed to the need to ensure ‘the greatest coherence’ between the ECHR and the 
Charter. Joint communication, n 6 supra, para. 1. Scheeck, n 10 supra, 14. Bronckers, n 43 supra, 604.  
103 S. Prechal and K. Cath, ‘The European acquis of civil procedure: constitutional aspects’, Uniform Law 
Review, vol. 19, no. 1 (2014), 1-20, 13.  
104 Scheeck, n 57 supra, 45.  
105 Interview B, N, Q, S and T. See also the CJEU judges quoted in Morano-Foadi: ‘Judges are responsible 
people and, for obvious reasons, they want to avoid conflicts or create chaos.’ and: ‘the last thing we have ever 
wanted is a situation where we were going to have a condemnation from Strasbourg’ . Morano-Foadi and 
Andreadakis, n 10 supra, 43 and 47-48. 
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avoid ‘double loyalties’ for Member States so that they do not have to choose between 
complying with their EU obligations or complying with the ECHR.106 Rosas likewise noted 
the intention to avoid the situation that the ECHR and EU take on ‘two different strikes’, 
because this would create problems for Member States.107  
Examining the case law of ECtHR is seen as especially relevant when Charter 
provisions correspond to the rights in the ECHR.108 One judge, for example, held: ‘If we have 
in the Charter a particular right, which comes out in the Convention so evidently, we will look 
what the Strasbourg Court has said in relation to this right when interpreting the Charter.’109 
Some interviewees noted that the case law of the ECtHR is closely studied in cases that deal 
with the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), especially asylum and Brussels II 
cases.110 One interviewee gave A, B & C, about the procedures to determine the sexual 
orientation of asylum seekers, as an example of a case in which the practice of the ECtHR 
was almost automatically considered–but not explicitly quoted.111 Likewise, the examination 
–and citation- of Strasbourg was considered inevitable in M’Bodj and Abdida that dealt with 
the removal of a third country national suffering a serious illness to a country where 
appropriate health treatment was not available.112 The examination of Strasbourg in these 
cases can also be attributed to the reference to the case law of the ECtHR with respect to 
Article 3 ECHR (Soering) in the Explanations to Article 19(2) of the Charter which deals with 
protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition.113 Another example mentioned 
was DEB which deals with Article 47(3) of the Charter. The Explanations to Article 47(3) 
refer to the ECtHR judgment in Airey which was a reason to consider this (and subsequent) 
judgments of the ECtHR.114  
Examination of Strasbourg case law also depends upon the extent to which the parties 
to the case have invoked the case law of the ECtHR, according to several interviewees.115 
                                                          
106 K. Lenaerts and J.A. Gutiérrez Fons, ‘The Place of the Charter in the EU Constitutional Edifice’, in S. Peers 
et al. (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Oxford, Hart 2014), paras. 55.03, 55.70 
and 55.90. 
107 Rosas, n 4 supra, 9. 
108 Interview X. 
109 Another CJEU judge, for example, referred to the ‘Charter being the House and the Convention being the 
Chamber in the house’. Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis, n 10 supra, 44 and 24. 
110 Interview A, E, X. 
111 Joined Cases 148/13 to  150/13, A, B and C [2014] nyr. Interview E.  
112 Case 542/13, M’Bodj [2014] nyr. Case 562/13, Adbida [2014]. Interview U. 
113 The Explanations to Article 19(2) refer to Ahmed v Austria, ECHR [1996]-VI, p. 2206 and Soering v United 
Kingdom, ECHR [1989] Ser. A No. 161. There is also a general reference to the case law of the ECtHR with 
respect to Article 28, the right of collective bargaining and action. 
114 Airey v Ireland, ECHR [1979] Ser. A No. p. 11. The Explanations are explicitly referred to in Case 279/09, 
DEB [2010] I-13849, para. 35. Interview Q. See also Prechal and Cath, n 103 supra, 14-15. 
115 Interview B, C, D, N, V. 
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Maybe even more important is the intervention of the Commission, who submits its 
observations in every case, as well as the contributions of the Member States in important 
cases.116 All these interventions mean that judges and référendaires do not have to start from 
scratch or reinvent the wheel. All necessary elements for a judgment are usually already there 
before the hearing or the publication of the Opinion of the AG.117 One interviewee noted that 
90 to 95% of the arguments in a case are usually brought up by the parties or by the agents of 
the intervening Member States. If a certain ECtHR inspired argument or a ECtHR specific 
judgment is not put forward, the chance is high that this argument is wrong or irrelevant.118 
Especially when an ECtHR related argument is given by many (intervening) parties and/ or 
repeated during the oral hearing, this is taken by the Court as a message that the argument 
must be closely studied.119 What usually happens in practice is that référendaires check the 
arguments of the (intervening) parties. They, for example, check whether the invoked 
legislation and case law is relevant or subject to new developments.120  
The absence of lengthy discussions about Strasbourg stems from the limited time for 
judges and their référendaires who are not the judge rapporteur to consider and discuss all the 
intricacies of the case in-depth.121 Judge Prechal, for example, noted that she does not have 
much time to do research of her own: ‘in a case in which you are the reporting judge, it may 
be necessary to do some background reading for the very simple reason that the reporting 
judge has the lead.’ 122 The time spent on a particular case is surprisingly small. One Judge is 
roughly dealing with 30 cases at the same time.123 The amount of time between receiving the 
first draft of the judgment and the first (and last) debate about it is often a matter of days 
rather than weeks. During this short period, judges also have to deal with other cases and 
hearings.124 There is a pressure to issue ‘an adequate judgment soon rather than a better 
judgment later’, especially in smaller Chambers.125 As will be discussed in the next section, 
the workload and pressure on judges also means that it is primarily up to the Reporting Judge 
to decide whether or not to cite the ECtHR.  
                                                          
116 Interview B, O, Q, Z. 
117 Interview U, X. 
118 Interview Z. 
119 Interview U, W. 
120 Interview Z. 
121 Interview E, N, P, W. 
122 Prechal, n 90 supra. See also E. Sharpston, ‘Making the Court of Justice of the European Union more 
productive’, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, vol. 21, no. 4 (2014), 763-770, 765-766. 
123 Interview N. 
124 Interview N. Prechal, n 90 supra. 
125 Schiemann, n 16 supra, 294.  
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The extent to which Strasbourg is examined depends very much upon the personal 
interests and expertise of référendaires and judges. Judges and référendaires who worked 
earlier in or with Strasbourg are obviously more sensitive towards ECtHR case law.126 There 
are several factors which have contributed to a greater awareness of the ECtHR among these 
and other CJEU officials. There are some informal mechanisms that ensure that judges and 
référendaires at the CJEU are kept informed about the case law of the ECtHR. The most 
obvious way is the ‘Reflets’, a newsletter that appears twice or three times a year and that 
contains ‘quick information on legal developments of European Union interest’.127 The 
Reflets include short summaries of the most important judgments of the ECtHR as well as 
national courts and some international courts or tribunals. Some interviewees also regularly 
consult the website of the ECtHR or read monthly overviews of the judgments of ECtHR.128 
Important judgments of the ECtHR (or national courts) are sometimes circulated via email.129 
Some Cabinets also discuss recent interesting judgments of the CJEU, ECtHR or other 
(inter)national courts during monthly lunch meetings.130 The disadvantage of the Reflets, 
which comprise sometimes more than 70 pages, or some of the other mechanisms is that 
interviewees read about cases that are not necessarily relevant at that moment.131 An 
additional problem is the earlier mentioned workload.132 One interviewee noted that he/she 
received 40 or 50 centimeters of paper for which he/she has not more than 15 minutes reading 
time.133 Another mechanism which has contributed to a higher awareness of the ECtHR 
among CJEU judges are regular meetings with ECtHR judges which take place usually once 
or twice a year.134 During these meetings, there are general discussions about matters of 
common interest and similar (upcoming) legal questions, but no discussions on pending 
cases.135 There have, for example, been discussions about the institutional and procedural 
matters that would flow from the EU’s accession to the ECHR.136 Judges also meet on other 
occasions, such as conferences and roundtables, or they invite each other to give speeches at 
                                                          
126 Interview B, N, V.  
127 The Reflets have appeared since 1999 in French and since 2010 in English at:. 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7063/ [last accessed 4 May 2015]. Interview M, N, R, Z. 
128 Interview M, R, V. Rosas, n 4 supra, 9. Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis, n 10 supra, 42. 
129 Interview M, R. 
130 Interview R. 
131 Interview M, N, R. 
132 Interview O, Q, R, V, X.  
133 Interview N.  
134 These meetings have taken place since 1998. Usually between 15 and 20 Judges or AGs from the CJEU 
participate in these meetings. Interview Q. Scheeck, n 10 supra,6. Jacobs, n 6 supra, 552. McCrudden, n 9 supra, 
390. C. Timmermans, ‘The relationship between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of 
Human Rights’, in A. Arnull et al. (eds), A constitutional order of states (Oxford: Hart 2011), 151-160, 153.  
135 Interview N, Q, T, W. Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis, n 10 supra, 45. 
136 Interview B, N. 
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each other’s courts.137 The regular meetings and encounters were considered helpful by 
almost all interviewees.138 Judges noted that the meetings ‘enhance the relationship of trust’ 
and give an opportunity to meet and know each other.139 The regular meetings also offer an 
opportunity for the CJEU to explain to the Strasbourg judges the complicated EU context with 
respect to mutual trust and mutual recognition in order to avoid misunderstandings.140 Some 
interviewees also noted that these meetings have contributed to a bigger impact of the case 
law of the ECtHR on the CJEU.141 The meetings, for example, have offered a chance to 
inquire whether there might be recent or upcoming judgments that would otherwise be 
overlooked.142  
 
3. Explicit references to the case law of the ECtHR 
Despite the CJEU’s reluctance from a formally legal and jurisdictional point to accept that it 
is explicitly bound by the ECHR as interpreted by ECtHR (see section 1.2), it is willing to 
take account of the case law of the ECtHR (see section 1.1). Section 3.1 will examine the 
practice of citing Strasbourg post-Lisbon, while section 3.2 will try to shed some light on the 
reasons which have been given by the interviewees for (not) citing the ECtHR, which are 
rarely spelled out by CJEU in its judgments.143  
 
3.1. How? An overview of references to the ECtHR in the judgments of the CJEU post-
Lisbon 
Post-Lisbon, the CJEU has continued referring to the case law of the ECtHR in its judgments, 
albeit less frequently than before the entry into force of the Charter. The case law of the 
ECtHR is sometimes used as a source of inspiration144, sometimes ‘by analogy’145 and, at 
other times, the judgments of the ECtHR are directly relied upon as if it they are the CJEU’s 
own judgments.146 Some judgments only make a passing reference to the ECtHR147, while 
                                                          
137 Interview N, V. 
138 Interview A, B, N, O, Q, T. 
139 Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis, n 10 supra 43. 
140 Interview A.  
141 Interview B, O, Q, T.  
142 Interview W. 
143 Harpaz, n 12 supra, 109. 
144 See, for example, AG Bot in Case 43/12, European Commission v European Parliament [2014] nyr, para. 65.  
145 See, for example, Joined Cases 293/12 and 594/12, Digital Rights Ireland [2014] nyr, para. 47, 54 and 55. AG 
Jääskinen in Joined Cases 201/11 P, C-204/11 P and 205/11 P, UEFA [2012] nyr,  para. 38- 41.  
146 See, for example, Joined Cases 92/09 and 93/09, Schecke [2010] I-11063, para. 52. For a case of the GC, see 
T-380/10, Wabco [2013] nyr, para. 46.  
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others extensively discuss the content of the judgments of the ECtHR.148 The most often 
mentioned judgments are Kadi I149 and NS.150 What is more, sometimes the ECHR and the 
case law of the ECtHR are not referred to at all, even though this might have been possible or 
desirable.151 This would, for example, be the case if (one of) the parties referred to the 
ECtHR152, or when national courts explicitly asked about conformity with the EC(t)HR in 
their preliminary references.153 Likewise, there could be reason for the CJEU to do so when 
the AG paid extensive attention to the EC(t)HR in his or her Opinion.154  
There has, however, been a change post-Lisbon as to the frequency of express citations 
of the ECtHR. Almost all interviewees noted the tendency after Lisbon to refer less often to 
the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR and instead rely (exclusively) on the Charter and 
the own case law of the CJEU.155 This view is also confirmed by De Búrca who examined the 
period between 2009 and 2012 from a quantitative point of view.156 These views thus confirm 
the proposition presented in the introduction that the CJEU has increasingly relied on its 
‘own’ instrument. The best example is the CJEU’s case law with respect to Article 47 of the 
Charter. The CJEU held several times that: ‘Article 47 of the Charter secures in EU law the 
protection afforded by Article 6(1) of the ECHR. It is necessary, therefore, to refer only to 
Article 47’.157 CJEU Judge Safjan counted that only 16 out of the approximately 60 post-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
147 See, for example, Case 291/12, Schwarz [2013] nyr, para. 27. 
148 Case 400/10 PPU, J. McB. v L.E [2010] I-08965, para. 53. Case 279/09, DEB [2010] I-13849. Both De Witte 
and Marguery mentioned these cases as examples of careful analysis of the case law of the ECtHR by the CJEU. 
Marguery, n 6 supra, 285. De Witte, n 3 supra, 34.  
149 Joined Cases 402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi [2008] I-06351. Interview B, Q, Z. F. Fabbrini and J. Larik, 
‘Dialoguing for due process: Kadi, Nada, and the accession of the EU to the ECHR’, Working paper No. 125 
(2013), 6. Timmermans, n 134 supra, 153. 
150 Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and Others [2011] I-13905. Interview V, W. De Baere, n 74 
supra, 14. Timmermans, n 7 supra, 10. 
151 De Witte, for example, noted that there is an extensive case law of the ECtHR in relation to the detention of 
irregular migrants, which was not referred to in Case 357/09, Kadzoev [2009] I-11189. De Witte (2011), 32 
152 See, for example, Case 69/10, Samba Diouf [2011] I-07151. Case 534/11, Arslan [2013] nyr. Case 239/12 
Abdulrahim v Council [2013] nyr.  
153 See, for example, Case 70/10, Scarlet [2011] I-11959. Case 416/10, Križan [2013] nyr. Case 361/12, Carratu 
[2013] nyr. Case 617/10, Åkerberg Fransson [2013] nyr, paras. Case 283/11, Sky Österreich [2013] nyr. AG 
Kokott also noted that Sky Österreich only examined the Charter despite the national court asking about 
Additional Protocol No 1 to the ECHR. AG Kokott in Case 398/13 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami [2015], para. 67. 
154 See, for example, Case 550/07 P, Akzo Nobel v Commission [2010] I-08301. C-272/09 P, KME v 
Commission [2011] I-12789. Joined cases C-71/11 and C-99/11, Y and Z [2012] nyr. Case 60/12, Marián Baláž 
[2013] nyr. Case 146/14 PPU, Ali Mahdi [2014] nyr. Joined Cases 473/13 and 514/13 and in Case 474/13, Bero 
[2014]. C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien [2014] nyr. C-169/14 PPU, Morcillo [2014] nyr. C-129/14 PPU, Spasic 
[2014] nyr. 
155 Interview A, C, D, N, Q, R, S, V and W. Only one interviewee noted an increase in references to the ECtHR. 
Interview B. 
156 De Búrca, n 7 supra, 174-176. Eckes, however, found more references to the ECHR (the Convention instead 
of the ECtHR) in period 2010-2012 than in 2007-2009. Eckes, n 6 supra. 
157 See, for example, Case 386/10 P, Chalkor v Commission [2011] ECR I-13085, para. 51. Case 71/11, Otis 
[2012] nyr, para. 47. Case 396/11, Radu [2013] nyr, para. 32.  
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Lisbon cases dealing with effective judicial protection referred to Strasbourg, something 
which CJEU Judge Prechal qualified as understandable because Article 47 is a self-standing 
principle.158 As will be discussed in the next subsection, this increased reliance on the Charter 
aims to underline the autonomy of the EU legal order and the Charter.159 
 
3.2. Why? Reasons for the CJEU (not) to quote in particular cases 
As discussed in the section 2, there is no decision, strategy or common plan within the CJEU 
on how to deal with the case law of the ECtHR. This is also holds true for the matter of 
expressly citing Strasbourg. It depends very much upon the judges involved, and especially 
the judge rapporteur and his/her référendaires, whether references to Strasbourg are included 
in the judgment.160 Every judge has a different writing style based on his or her preferences, 
legal education and professional experience. Some have a more succinct style, while others 
are more elaborate. Some prefer a (systematic) case law approach, while others are more 
interested in solving the case at hand.161 The existence of these personal differences and 
differences between formations, does not mean that there are no overarching ideas as to 
whether or not citation of the case law of the ECtHR is desirable. This section discusses 
several considerations emerging from the interviews conducted that have shaped the readiness 
of judges and référendaires to cite the Strasbourg case-law. 
 
Emphasis on solving the dispute and persuading the parties, the general public and national 
courts 
There is a great emphasis on solving the case at hand.162 The CJEU primarily sees its 
judgment as a device to explain the outcome towards the parties.163 Former Judge Schiemann, 
for example, noted that it is the CJEU’s task to come up with a solution in a concrete case and 
explain why the loser has lost instead of giving an academic treatise.164 When several 
(intervening) parties explicitly relied on the case law of the ECtHR in their written and oral 
pleadings, the CJEU feels also more compelled to explicitly refer to Strasbourg, because this 
                                                          
158 M. Safjan, ‘A Union of effective judicial protection. Addressing a multi-level challenge through the lens of 
Article 47 CFREU’, King’s College London, February 2014, 9. Prechal and Cath, n 103 supra 14. 
159 One interviewee noted that this should, however, not be seen as a deed of animosity. Interview C. 
160 Interview B, E, N, T, V, Z.. 
161 Interview A, B, C, N, O, R. One interviewee disagreed that personal differences played a role. Interview X. 
162 Interview D, U. Prechal, n 90 supra.  
163 Interview C, I. 
164 Schiemann, n 16 supra, 287. Schiemann (2005), 742. Mak, n 9 supra, 444. 
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shows that it has taken into account the arguments put forward.165 The CJEU’s judgment is 
also seen as an explanation towards the general public. This also means that when a 
judgments deals with a sensitive or complex matter, where the CJEU’s decision is not self-
evident, there is more reason for the CJEU to refer to Strasbourg.166 With a citation, the CJEU 
could emphasise that it is not alone and has not done a ‘very special discovery’.167 Especially 
in landmark cases, such as Kadi and NS, there is a need to fortify arguments and bolster the 
persuasive force of CJEU judgments.168 Former CJEU Judge Timmermans, for example, held 
that references to the ECtHR in CJEU judgments: ‘may possibly increase their legitimacy and 
improve the acceptance of [the CJEU’s] own case law’.169 Likewise, former AG Maduro 
argued that citations ‘provide an added guarantee for the social acceptance of its decisions and 
its smoother application by national courts’.170 This was also put forward by an interviewee 
who noted that citing ECtHR could reassure national (constitutional) courts and secure 
compliance with a CJEU judgment, because it makes it more difficult for national courts to 
object.171  
The CJEU does not regard  the ECtHR as its relevant audience. Explicitly referring to 
ECtHR as a signal to Strasbourg that the CJEU has taken into account (or is obedient to the 
ECtHR) is therefore not considered a very strong reason for doing so, even though this is 
sometimes mentioned in the literature as a motive for citing.172 It was noted that national 
courts are not doing that either.173 One interviewee told about a ‘corridor joke’ in the CJEU 
that Strasbourg is almost begging the CJEU to cite it, because there is a great concern in 
Strasbourg about the more limited citations of the ECtHR post-Lisbon. But the CJEU is not 
referring to the ECtHR to make judges in Strasbourg happy.174 
The focus on solving the dispute and on explaining the decision to the parties of the 
case also means that the CJEU is reluctant to go beyond the case file and the specific 
                                                          
165 Interview U, V, W 
166 Interview C, V. Iglesias Sánchez, n 27 supra, 1604. 
167 Interview A and B. For similar arguments in the literature, see McCrudden, n 68 supra, 514, 519 and 523. 
A.M. Slaughter, ‘A typology of transjudicial communication’, University of Richmond Law Review (1994), 99-
137, 118. C.N. Kakouris, ‘Use of the comparative method by the Court of Justice of the European Communities’, 
Pace International Law Review, vol. 6, no. 2 (1994), 267-283. Lenaerts, n 68 supra (2003), 875. 
168 Bronckers, n 43 supra. Douglas-Scott, n 16 supra. Senden, n 24 supra, 367. 
169 Timmermans, n 134 supra, 153. 
170 M.P. Maduro, ‘Interpreting European Law: Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional Pluralism’, 
European Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 1, no. 2 (2007), 6. See also Scheeck, n 10 supra, 16. Slaughter, n 167 
supra, 114-116. 
171 Interview X.  
172 Interview O, Z.  
173 Interview A. 
174 Interview W. One interviewee, however, noted that a reason to explicitly cite the ECtHR is to show 
Strasbourg that the CJEU still deserves the Bosphorus presumption of equivalent protection. Interview B. 
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constellation of the facts. Several interviewees noted that the CJEU aims to solve the case 
within these boundaries without adding an obiter dictum.175 CJEU judges are anxious to 
restrict their judgments to the ‘smallest possible compass’ rather than laying down broad or 
abstract guidelines for all cases that might pop up in future.176 If a case incidentally deals with 
fundamental rights, the CJEU will not use that case as a pretext to give its broader reflections 
on such fundamental rights issues.177 This is because of the risk that the CJEU develops 
something that does not fit well with the case.178 Judges are cautious and prefer to follow a 
step by step approach dealing with one case at a time, because they are interested in the 
CJEU’s legitimacy in the long term.179 De Búrca also noted that the CJEU thinks that its 
legitimacy and the acceptability of its judgments is best served by a cautious and minimalist 
stance.180 There is thus a concern to remain within EU competences and resist a ‘federal 
temptation’ whereby fundamental rights are used to transform the EU legal order on the 
CJEU’s own initiative.181 These considerations mean that the ECtHR will only be explicitly 
cited when this is really necessary or very relevant for the solution of the case.182 One 
example of a case which has been criticised for the fact that it did not refer to the case law of 
the ECtHR was Google Spain about the right to be forgotten. One interviewee held that this 
case was not regarded as the right occasion to deal explicitly with access to information as 
being part of the right to freedom of expression, since the case did not involve a person with 
political relevance where that would play a role.183 This interviewee noted that the CJEU has 
to wait for another opportunity to express itself upon these matters. Another  example is Radu, 
where the CJEU held that Romanian authorities could not refuse to execute a European arrest 
warrant issued by the German authorities for the purposes of conducting a criminal 
prosecution on the ground that the requested person was not heard by the German authorities 
before the arrest warrant was issued. According to some, the CJEU paid insufficient attention 
to fundamental rights considerations, including the case law of the ECtHR, and failed to 
                                                          
175 Interview C, O, U. The CJEU is also hesitant to apply the case law of the ECtHR ex officio, unless it is 
obvious that something is contrary to ECHR. Interview Q. 
176 Interview N. 
177 Interview Z. 
178 Interview I. 
179 Interview C. Another consideration is that it is also difficult and not desirable for the CJEU to reverse its own 
judgments (all too often). Interview O. 
180 De Búrca, n 7 supra, 178. 
181 Polakiewicz, n 7 supra, 9. P. Cruz Villalón, ‘Rights in Europe. The Crowded House’, King’s College Working 
Paper, no. 1 (2012), 11. 
182 Interview D, E, O, W, Z. One interviewee noted that there are less than a handful of cases within one year (Z). 
183 Interview C. Case 131/12, Google Spain [2014] nyr. In its case law, the ECtHR has given more prominence 
to the right to freedom of expression and the right to access and receive information. E. Frantziou. ‘Further 
developments in the right to be forgotten’, Human Rights Law Review, vol.14 (2014), 761-777, 772. 
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transpose its N.S. logic to this case.184 Several interviewees noted that fundamental rights 
considerations or the Charter did not play a role at all and that it would be dangerous had the 
CJEU gone into that.185 Interviewees felt that Radu was not the proper case to express itself 
on fundamental rights concerns that certainly exist with respect to the EAW, and thus had to 
await another case in future. Radu only dealt with the surrender of Radu by the Romanian 
authorities and not the role of the fundamental rights in the subsequent trial process in 
Germany.186 
The tendency to only solve a dispute without offering an ‘academic treatise’ also 
reflects a reluctance to frame everything in terms of fundamental rights.187 There is a strong 
consciousness among the interviewees that the CJEU is not a human rights or fundamental 
rights court. 188 President Skouris, for example, held in May 2014 that: ‘the Court of Justice is 
not a human rights court; it is the Supreme Court of the European Union’.189 Several 
interviewees considered fundamental rights not to be the centre of the problem in many cases 
before the Court. Only in a handful of cases are they essential to the problem.190 Cases are 
preferably solved on the basis of secondary legislation, especially when there is secondary 
legislation that contains a certain balance between clashing fundamental rights.191 One 
example given during the interviews was Abdullahi where the CJEU had to answer the rather 
factual question what the first asylum seeker’s country of entry was, Greece or Hungary. This 
was not considered a fundamental rights question that warranted an ECHR analysis despite 
the fact that the Austrian court referred to the ECtHR and M.S.S. in its preliminary questions 
to the CJEU.192  
 
                                                          
184 Case 396/11, Radu [2013] nyr.  
185 Interview I, X, Z.  
186 One interviewee noted that this trial phase does not fall within the scope of EU law and, thus, the Charter. It 
would be dangerous had the CJEU nonetheless dealt with this, since this would suggest that Union law is 
applicable even though there is no EU competence.  What’s more, as the CJEU also noted in its judgment, an 
arrest warrant must have a certain element of surprise and prevent the person concerned from taking flight, 
which was seen as a real risk by one interviewee. Case 396/11, Radu [2013] nyr, para. 40. Interview I. 
187 Interview C. 
188 Interview N, X, Q. This despite some wishful thinking assertions in the literature that fundamental rights are 
truly decisive. S. Morano-Foadi and S. Andreadakis, ‘Reflections on the architecture of the EU after the Treaty 
of Lisbon: the European judicial approach to fundamental rights’, European Law Journal, vol. 17, no. 5 (2011), 
595-610. 
189 L. Besselink, ‘The CJEU as the European ‘Supreme Court’: Setting Aside Citizens’ Rights for EU Law 
Supremacy’, 18 augustus 2014, at: http://www.verfassungsblog.de/CJEU-european-supreme-court-setting-aside-
citizens-rights-eu-law-supremacy/. Interview Q. 
190 Interview A (only 5%), E, N, Q (less than 20%), U, Z (20% would be a lot). McCrudden, n 9 supra, 407. 
191 Interview E.  
192 Case 394/12, Abdullahi [2013] nyr. Interview W.  
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Keepings judgments as concise as possible 
Closely related to the first point of solving the dispute at hand is the desire to keep judgments 
to the essential and as concise as possible.193 This also relates to the continental or French 
approach of the CJEU with a fairly minimalist, formulaic and impersonal style of 
reasoning.194 This minimalist style of referencing in judgments also exists with respect to the 
CJEU’s own precedents, as some interviewees noted.195 The tendency to limit judgments to 
the essential means that if the judge rapporteur agrees with the AG and follows his or her 
Opinion, it is not always found necessary to repeat the AG’s analysis and citations of 
ECtHR.196 This also explains why many judgments of the CJEU do not refer to the case law 
of the ECtHR, despite extensive discussion in the Opinion of the AG.197 Keeping judgments 
to the essential also means that quite often initial references to the ECtHR in the draft written 
by the judge rapporteur are struck out at the deliberation stage if they are not strictly 
necessary, because they unnecessarily lengthen the judgment.198 This happened, for example, 
in Pupino, where the final judgment quoted the ECtHR less extensively than the initial 
draft.199 An argument for omitting explicit references to Strasbourg is that it is already evident 
that the EC(t)HR is taken into account, because of the obligation of Article 52(3) of the 
Charter.200 There is thus no need to stress that in the judgment itself. Likewise, one 
interviewee noted that because the ECtHR has already held that the fundamental rights 
protection within the EU is presumed to be at least equivalent, there is no need to quote 
Strasbourg either.201 
There are several reasons for the minimalistic style of referencing to (inter)national 
courts, including the ECtHR. Firstly, the fact that the CJEU works on the basis of a single 
collegiate judgment adopted by consensus. The more things to be discussed and included in a 
certain judgment, the greater the risk of divisions among judges.202 Every sentence is 
examined by many eyes and can potentially give rise to disagreement.203 This thus favours 
                                                          
193 Interview I, N, O, U,  Z. 
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brevity and means that the judgment is limited to the very essential.204 Secondly, the 
inclination to keep judgments short is also inspired by more practical considerations, such as 
the wish to get through the caseload as quickly and efficiently as possible given the heavy 
workload of the CJEU and the limited time available.205 Thirdly, the tendency to keep 
judgments short also stems from the cautiousness of judges. Some interviewees noted that the 
more references are put in a judgment, the bigger the risk is that a mistake is made in terms of 
referring to wrong or outdated case law or cases that have a completely different factual 
context.206 Former Judge Schiemann likewise noted that the ‘simplest course for the judge is 
not to mention any foreign influences’, because if a judge cites ‘a mere snippet’ this would 
leave him exposed to criticism that he has not grasped the entire context.207 Some 
interviewees therefore expressed the idea that it is better not to quote at all, because if you 
only quote on some occasions, while not on other occasions, this might create the impression 
that the case law of the ECtHR has not always been taken into account.208 A wrong citation 
could also attract negative attention and criticism.209 A complicating factor with respect to the 
case law of the ECtHR is that it is difficult to really keep track of all the developments in 
Strasbourg, also because commentaries on the ECHR sometimes lag behind a couple of years 
with respect to certain fields of law. This makes it really difficult for the CJEU to be 
completely sure about whether they have arrived at a complete picture.210  
 
Solving the case on the basis of the CJEU’s own case law and secondary EU legislation 
There is an inclination to solve a case as far as possible on the basis of the CJEU’s own case 
law and secondary EU legislation.211 It is not felt necessary to quote Strasbourg when the 
reasoning in the judgment can be solidly based on the CJEU’s own case law, Union law 
and/or the legal text of the Charter and the Explanation thereto.212 Interviewees noted that the 
case law of the ECtHR should really have ‘added value’ or have been ‘decisive’ in the 
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deliberative phase in order for it to be cited. Otherwise the CJEU would just refer to its own 
precedents only.213 Referring to Strasbourg thus happens when a Charter provision has never 
been applied or interpreted before or when there is no corresponding principle in the Charter 
or the CJEU’s own case law.214 One example is DEB, where the solution to the case (legal aid 
to legal persons) could not be immediately derived from the Charter and where different 
interpretations were possible.215 The CJEU turned to the ECtHR for inspiration and performed 
a ‘lengthy examination’ even though it was not requested by the referring court to do so.216 
By contrast, the case law of ECtHR with respect to detention of illegal migrants was 
considered, but not quoted, in the context of Kadzoev, since there was a clear source of EU 
law (Directive) which gave all the indications needed to deal with the case.217 Likewise, as 
mentioned earlier, the case law of the ECtHR was duly considered in the refugee protection 
cases of A, B & C and X, Y & Z, but not cited because the case could be solved by solely 
interpreting secondary legislation (implicitly) in line with fundamental rights.218 The latter 
also implies, as several interviewees stressed, that the CJEU is not citing simply for the sake 
of citing or citing for purely ornamental purposes as window-dressing.219 When a certain 
result or interpretation is obvious, there is no need to cite the ECtHR. One interviewee said 
that quoting in a pretty obvious situation is the same as saying ‘it rains’ when water is coming 
out of the air.220 
Another expression of this tendency to rely on the CJEU’s own precedents is the 
feeling that it is not necessary to constantly refer back to Strasbourg precedents, or in the 
words of two interviewees to ‘Adam and Eva’ or ‘Noah’s ark’.221 The preferred route is to 
only refer to the CJEU’s own precedent in which the case law of the ECtHR was considered 
and quoted for the first time. One example is Åkerberg Fransson, which referred back to 
Bonda which examined the ECtHR’s Engel-criteria determining whether a prosecution is 
criminal in nature.222 Likewise, Kaveh Puid only cited the CJEU’s own precedent of N.S. and 
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not the ECtHR equivalent of M.S.S. that played an important role in the N.S. judgment.223 
Likewise, the judgment of Trade Agency only referred to the CJEU’s own judgment in DEB 
which discussed the ECtHR extensively.224 In these cases the ECtHR case law is thus 
implicitly or indirectly referred to.225 Some interviewees noted that referring to the older 
ECtHR precedent is risky in the sense that there might have been new developments in the 
ECtHR context. Checking this would require an additional effort, which is simply not 
undertaken if the CJEU does not really need the ECtHR reference.226  
 
Different courts and different approaches  
Another feature which has limited the applicability and the possibility of citing the Strasbourg 
case law is that the CJEU and the ECtHR are seen as completely different courts with 
completely different roles, as AG Maduro also noted in his Opinion in Kadi I.227 The ECtHR 
conducts an external and subsidiary review to ensure that fundamental rights of individuals 
are sufficiently protected in specific cases, whereas the task of the CJEU is to ensure the strict 
uniformity, primacy and effectiveness of EU law.228 Both courts also depart from different 
logics in another way. Given the prominence of economic freedoms, the CJEU, for example, 
examines the lawfulness of resorting to fundamental rights when these interfere with 
fundamental market freedoms, whereas the ECtHR merely examines the legality of a 
restriction on a certain fundamental right.229 This different approach was also highlighted by 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
with the ECtHR’s Engel case law. A. Andreangeli, ‘Ne bis in idem and Administrative Sanctions: Bonda’, 
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AG Kokott in her Views in Opinion 2/13.230 In addition, many EU fundamental rights cases 
arise in the context of competition law where undertakings invoke the right against self-
incrimination, access to legal aid and presumption of innocence. Such claims of legal persons 
might necessitate a different solution than fundamental rights claims of individuals in the 
ECHR context.231 Several interviewees noted that the ECtHR has a more intergovernmental 
or state-centered perspective, whereas the CJEU also has to consider the more transnational 
and integrational aspects of EU law. This tension is especially apparent in the Area for 
Freedom Security and Justice, for example, with respect to the Dublin Regulation and the 
European Arrest Warrant.232 The CJEU has to avoid that the system based on mutual trust and 
mutual recognition collapses by refusing that executing (national courts in other) Member 
States start to second guess decisions and procedures of other Member States all too easily.233 
These views are also visible in Opinion 2/13, where the CJEU held that the ECHR obligation 
for Member States to check that other Member States have observed fundamental rights 
affects ‘the specific characteristics of EU law and its autonomy’. The CJEU emphasised that 
Member States are required under EU law to presume that fundamental rights have been 
observed, save only in exceptional circumstances.234 One interviewee noted that these EU law 
particularities of mutual trust and mutual recognition are not familiar for some Strasbourg 
judges as a result of which this different context is not always sufficiently taken into account 
by the ECtHR.235 
Several interviewees also noted that it is also unnecessary or sometimes even wrong to 
refer to the ECtHR if the case before the CJEU is different from a Strasbourg precedent.236 
Situations should really be the same.237 The case law of the ECtHR is not always considered 
very useful, because it has a rather casuistic and detailed approach concentrating very much 
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on the national context and law.238 Schwarz, for example, made only a short reference to the 
ECtHR case of S and Marper. The reason for this was that there was a ‘huge difference’ 
between both cases.239 Schwarz involved an ordinary citizen who was denied a passport since 
he refused to give his fingerprints so that they could be stored on that passport, while S and 
Marper was about the retention of fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles of two 
British suspects. There was thus no more than limited overlap and the case law of the ECtHR 
was considered only partially useful.240 The CJEU prefers to omit or limit references to the 
ECtHR in such cases instead of explaining in what way the cases are different, also because 
this would unnecessarily lengthen the judgment.241 In Google Spain, there were no references 
to the case law of the ECtHR exactly because this case law did not entirely cover the subject, 
because judgments of the ECtHR to that date only dealt with a private person and a press 
agencies or newspapers instead of a search engine like Google.242 In Y&Z and X, Y & Z, the 
ECtHR was felt to be of less importance, because the question was not so much whether a 
particular state lived up to the standards of the ECHR, but whether the criminalisation of, 
respectively, religious practices and homosexual acts constitute acts of persecution.243  
 
Strategic reasons: developing an autonomous interpretation of the Charter 
There are some more strategically oriented ideas that motivate the CJEU to cite the ECtHR or 
not.244 One interviewee noted that the less frequent citation of ECtHR might relate to the fear 
that by citing, the CJEU implicitly acknowledges that the ECtHR is superior.245 Another 
interviewee argued that it would be ‘problematic’ or ‘weird’ for a court to quote another court 
all too often, because that seems to imply that it lacks authority of its own.246 This fear of 
being seen as too reliant and, hence, losing authority is also discussed in the literature.247  
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A more nuanced version of this ‘highest authority’ notion is the idea that there is no 
reason to explicitly quote the ECHR and the ECtHR when the Charter goes further than the 
ECHR or when a Charter right is not included in the ECHR.248 There is even a strong desire 
among several interviewees that the importance,  autonomy and higher level of protection of 
the EU’s ‘own catalogue’ should be underlined by citing Strasbourg less often.249 Several 
interviewees noted that this is a natural and logical development, because the Charter was 
exactly developed with a view to giving the EU its own fundamental rights catalogue. It 
would, therefore, be strange had the CJEU continued with using the EC(t)HR as point of 
departure via the general principles of EU law.250 This was compared with the practice of 
some Constitutional Courts which (only) apply and interpret their own Constitution and omit 
any reference to the EC(t)HR.251 The earlier mentioned Chalkor reasoning of ‘only’ referring 
to Article 47 Charter is the best example of ‘Charter-centrism’.252 Likewise, AG Kokott, for 
example, dismissed the argument of the appellants in Inuit II that the General Court should 
have referred to the ECHR on the grounds that they failed to explain the ‘additional benefit’ 
in doing so. She implied that a reference to the ECHR would only be warranted if the ECHR 
is imposing higher requirements than the Charter.253  
The search for autonomy might also explain why there has recently been a trend 
towards marginally checking the conformity with Strasbourg at the end of the deliberative 
process. This is also increasingly visible in the actual judgments where the Strasbourg-
proofness of the judgment is mentioned at the end as a ‘by the way’ note. This underlines the 
CJEU’s wish to first develop its own vision.254 One example given by the interviewees was 
Melloni, where the CJEU mentioned at the end, without much elaboration: ‘This 
interpretation of Articles 47 and 48(2) of the Charter is in keeping with the scope that has 
been recognised for the rights guaranteed by Article 6(1) and (3) of the ECHR by the case-law 
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of the European Court of Human Rights’.255 The CJEU did something similar in Elgafaj when 
it referred to, but did not really discuss several judgments of the ECtHR: ‘It should also, 
lastly, be added that the interpretation … is fully compatible with the ECHR, including the 
case-law of the ECtHR’.256 Likewise, AG Szpunar offered a textual interpretation of 
Article 15(6) of the Return Directive 2008/115 in Ali Mahdi and subsequently noted that the 
case law of the ECtHR ‘confirms that conclusion’.257 Another example is the observation of 
AG Sharpston in M., after discussing the case law of the CJEU, that the ‘Court’s approach 
thus far seems to me not dissimilar from that of ECtHR’.258 This marginal cross-check relates 
to another practice pointed out by some interviewees that the CJEU has started to cite the 
ECtHR in order to differentiate and argue why a certain practice is not contrary to the 
ECHR.259 The CJEU, for example, held that the case law of the ECtHR with respect to Article 
6 ECHR, more in particular the Menarini judgment, does not preclude a ‘penalty’ from being 
imposed by an administrative authority in the first instance when such a penalty can be 
reviewed by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and can quash the decision of the 
authority.260 Likewise, the CJEU held in Bonda that the administrative nature of the measures 
provided for in the relevant Regulation ‘is not called into question by an examination of the 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on the concept of ‘criminal proceedings’ 
within the meaning of Article 4(1) of Protocol No 7’.261  
 
4. Concluding remarks: the road ahead 
This article tried to explain why the CJEU examines and cites the case law of the Strasbourg 
Court in some cases and not in others. It did so on the basis of interviews with those working 
in the Court of Justice. This article showed that the CJEU has continued examining and citing 
the case law of the ECtHR in several judgments post-Lisbon, even though the CJEU is not 
formally bound by the ECHR and the interpretation of the ECtHR. With the entry in force of 
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the Charter, the CJEU has, however, started to examine and cite the case law less frequently 
and extensively. From the interviews several factors can be distilled that actually work against 
an impact of the case law of the ECtHR on the CJEU. This includes, above all, the  limited 
time available for the judges and their référendaires to extensively study and keep track of the 
case law of the ECtHR given their workload as well as the focus on the parties and the solving 
of the dispute. Especially with respect to the express citation of ECtHR judgments, more 
reasons not to cite were mentioned by the interviewees (see table for an overview). These 
reasons were summarized in five broader considerations limiting the readiness of judges and 
référendaires to cite the Strasbourg case-law. The latter two considerations are also reflected  
in the CJEU’s Opinion 2/13.262 A citation of ECtHR case law in a specific judgment is found 
necessary when that case law really had ‘added value’ in the deliberative phase, especially in 
sensitive or complex area, where a Charter provision had not yet been interpreted and applied 
or when the (intervening) parties relied on Strasbourg in their pleadings. 
 
Broader considerations 
informing the readiness not 
to cite the ECtHR 
More specific case specific considerations as to whether citation 
of the case law of the ECtHR is needed (or not) 
An emphasis on solving the 
dispute and persuading the 
parties, the general public and 
national courts  
Citation: 
• When (intervening) parties explicitly rely on case law  
• When it is a sensitive or complex matter 
No citation: 
• when this would go beyond the case file and the specific 
constellation of the facts 
• when fundamental rights are not at the heart of the case 
• to show the ECtHR that the case law was taken into account or 
to make Strasbourg happy 
A tendency to keep judgments 
as concise as possible  
No citation: 
• when references are not strictly necessary to solve the case 
• when the AG Opinion already quotes from the case law 
• when it is evident that the case law was already taken into 
account 
An inclination to solve the 
case on the basis of the 
CJEU’s own case law and 
secondary EU legislation  
Citation: 
• when (Charter) provision has not yet been applied before 
• when case law had ‘added value’ or was ‘decisive’ 
No citation: 
• when the reasoning can be based on CJEU’s own cases  
• when the result is obvious 
• when the case law can be referred to indirectly by mentioning 
the CJEU judgment that quoted the case law 
An awareness that both courts 
are different courts and adopt 
diverse approaches 
No citation: 
• when the (facts of the) cases are not really the same 
• when the case law needs explanation as to how it is different 
Strategic reasons related to the No citation: 
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wish to develop an 
autonomous interpretation of 
the Charter 
• when a Charter provision is not included in the ECHR or goes 
further than the ECHR  
• in order not to be seen as too reliant/ deferential  
 
It seems likely that this particular trend of examining and citing the case law of the 
ECtHR will continue.  Accession of the EU to the ECHR will in any case take long, if it will 
ever happen, given Opinion 2/13. The redrafting of the accession agreement as well as the 
required ratification of the resulting agreement by the Member States of the EU and Council 
of Europe is expected to take quite a while, which means that the CJEU has ample time to 
develop and bolster its own fundamental rights case law. The CJEU could find tacit support 
for the priority it gives in the implicit “hierarchy” in Article 6 TEU, which refers to the 
Charter in the first paragraph. Accession to the EU is only mentioned in the second  
paragraph, while the supplementary role of the ECHR as general principles of EU law is listed 
in the third paragraph.263 The growing Charter jurisprudence of the CJEU might diminish the 
need to turn to Strasbourg even further and might even give rise to ideas among stakeholders 
that accession is redundant in the light of the high level of fundamental rights protection 
within the European legal order.  
Even if the EU eventually accedes to the ECHR, the question remains whether that 
would fundamentally change something in the current practice of the CJEU with respect to 
the examination and citing of the ECtHR. AG Kokott, for example, noted  in Opinion 2/13 
that accession will not alter in any fundamental respect the CJEU’s obligation to carefully 
examine the case law of the ECtHR on the basis of Article 6(3) TEU and Article 52(3) of the 
Charter.264 Likewise CJEU Judge Rosas argued that formal accession would not change 
things radically.265 On the other hand, accession might require (all) judges to know the case 
law of the ECtHR even better and to examine it more in-depth, because EU acts would be 
directly reviewable by the ECtHR and the CJEU could be overruled by the ECtHR.266 In 
addition, national courts will most likely also start asking the CJEU whether EU acts comply 
with ECHR after accession.267 As far as citation of Strasbourg goes, accession to the ECHR 
will not (legally) change things either, because the CJEU is in any case not required to 
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interviewees. Interview A, Q. Scheeck, n 57 supra, 46. 
266 Interview V and Z. One CJEU judge also held that the CJEU should be ‘more cautious’ and ‘more attentive’ 
after accession and ensure that all relevant ECtHR cases are considered. Morano-Foadi and Andreadakis, n 10 
supra, 44. De Witte, n 3 supra, 24. Douglas-Scott, n 16 supra, 175-176. 
267 De Witte, n 3 supra, 33. 
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explicitly cite the ECtHR. Nonetheless, accession might entail that the CJEU considers the 
ECtHR as its relevant audience for its judgments. Currently, this is not the case and 
interviewees noted that the CJEU solely “communicates” to the parties, the general public and 
national courts and is not citing to keep Strasbourg happy. Accession could, however, mean 
that the CJEU sees more reason for citing in order to show Strasbourg that it has paid due 
regard to the case law of the ECtHR with the idea of diminishing the chances of being 
overruled. The future will tell what will happen. For now, the Charter will remain the most 
logical anchor point. 
 
 
